“What to Do with Universities?” A Defence through a Positivist Lens

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“What to Do with Universities?”

A Defence through a Positivist Lens

Behrang Sadighi
June 15, 2024

Reading Time: 13 minutes

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University and Revolution by Sadegh Zibakalam, Tehran: Rozeneh Publishing House, 2nd edition, 2019

University & Revolution discusses the positive and negative aspects of the connection between the 1979 revolution and the university in Iran. One of the important chapters of this book is the discussion about the Iranian Cultural Revolution, how this movement came about, and its unsuccessful end. The author also examines the state of humanities in Iran and the reason for the lack of research in universities and talks about the problems and unemployment of graduates.

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About Sadegh Zibakalam

Sadegh Zibakalam is an emiretus of political science from the Faculty of Political Science, University of Tehran and Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch of Tehran, and has many works in various fields, including Pahlavi political history, international relations, and the political environment after the 1979 revolution.

University and Revolution is a compilation of Sadegh Zibakalam’s works from 1993 to 2000 that examine the state of humanities and social sciences in Iran. Beyond newspaper articles, speeches, and interviews, the collection includes correspondence with high-ranking government officials regarding the dismissal of professors from the University of Tehran’s Faculty of Political Science, where he is an emeritus full professor. Zibakalam has become a controversial public figure in Iran due to his unconventional stances on sensitive issues. These include his stances on Iran-US relations, the legacy of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Islamization of humanities, the absolute authority of the jurist (Velayat-e Faqih), support for the Women, Life, Freedom movement, and, more recently, his position on Iran’s support for Hamas. Zibakalam captured the attention of the younger population through his frequent participation in social debates, his courage in expressing views contrary to the leader of the government positions, and his candid acknowledgment of evolving perspectives since the revolution’s early days. Several of Zibakalam’s over 20 books have ignited public debate. His most influential work, How Did We Become Who We Are (Ma chegouneh ma shodim) catapulted him to prominence. Published in three editions with a total of 34 printings between 1995 and 2019, it remains one of Iran’s bestselling social science books.[1]The book publisher claims that the Guardian newspaper praised University and Revolution as “the most significant work in the field of Iranian sociology following the Islamic Revolution.”

In How Did We Become Who We Are, Zibakalam tackles the prevalent question of Iran’s developmental lag. He posits that Iran’s challenges stem primarily from internal factors rooted in its social, economic, and political systems, as well as geographical constraints. Zibakalam rejects external factors like colonialism and foreign conspiracies as primary causes, arguing instead that they are consequences rather than origins of Iran’s backwardness. (Zibakalam, 1995). His perspective on Iran-West relations and his efforts to reframe the debates around it have elicited diverse reactions from Marxist leftists, Islamists, and others,[2]For some examples of these critics, see the critical notes authored by Saeed Zibakalam and others published as appendixes of the book. Also see Ahmad Seif (1998/1377) and Afshin Matin-Asgari (1998). but it remained a central framework for his analysis of other topics and has been recurrent in many of his works.

While avoiding delving more into the “psychology of personality” critique that we know Zibakalam does not appreciate (1999b: 299), it’s undeniable that University and Revolution‘s impact is significantly tied to its author’s public stature. In an interview with the Guardian in 2015, he was described as one of “the most prominent public intellectuals in Iran.” This statement may have considered his widely circulated books that have attracted public attention, his frequent media appearances, and incisive commentary on contemporary issues. 

Mending the Fractured Reputation

Zibakalam’s book aims to restore the reputation of Iranian universities and academics, which he argues has been unfairly maligned. He challenges the characterization of universities as Westernized, subservient, and pro-Pahlavi. He also critiques the government’s attempts to control university’s intellectual life and administration through Islamization policies reimplemented since the 1980 Cultural Revolution. However, this critical re-evaluation of the Cultural Revolution is based on a 19th-century positivist paradigm of the founders of social sciences that emphasizes the universality and objectivity of social science. (Zibakalam, 2020) 

While University and Revolution maintains its focus on the university, science, and humanities, it often intersects with the author’s favorite theme of Iran-West relations and reframing the impacts of colonialism on Iran’s underdevelopment. He aims to debunk the stereotypes of the pro-West universities by challenging the binary categorization of science, including social sciences, into Western and Eastern divisions. Zibakalam argues that this labeling justified the academic purges in Iran and fueled the creation of an “Islamic university” and “Islamic social sciences” concept. 

Zibakalam is not the first academic to advocate for restoring the university’s former status under the Islamic Republic. This pursuit dates back to the early 1980s, with an early attempt led by Mohammad Maleki, then head of the board of trustees at University of Tehran. Echoing Maleki’s stance, Zibakalam underscores the university’s pivotal role in the 1979 revolution, a contribution he believes has been overlooked. He likens the relationship between the Islamic Republic and the university to a failed marriage. Once a union marked by charm, respect, and camaraderie, it had deteriorated into a bitter and contentious partnership. He illustrates the initial enchantment by referencing the slogans that once adorned University of Tehran’s walls. These messages extolled the university’s pivotal role in the fight against oppression, despotism, and tyranny. Among the most resonant was the rallying cry “University is the Bastion of Freedom.” (Zibakalam, 2020) In 1994, the Minister of Culture and Higher Education, Hashemi Golpayegani (1993-1997) vehemently criticized the role of the university, branding pre-revolution graduates as “experts” who had signed “contracts” to enslave the nation. He alleged that these experts had used their knowledge to the benefit of foreign interests. This sweeping condemnation deeply troubled Zibakalam. He addressed the minister and wrote: 

Were universities truly the breeding grounds for corruption, moral decay, and subservience? Did university graduates, as the Minister alleged, perpetuated the nation’s entanglement with contracts? Were these institutions staunch supporters of the Shah’s regime? Did universities systematically transform our youth into uncommitted, unethical, and foreign influenced individuals?? I doubt that even the proponents of these accusations genuinely subscribe to them. The conducts of the pre-revolution graduates were in much the same as their contemporaries. Moreover, while a few graduates exhibited disloyalty and treachery, it is essential to acknowledge the countless others who made substantial contributions to various industries. Similarly, while some graduates succumbed to dependency, many students and graduates tragically suffered persecution, imprisonment, and even death at the hands of the oppressive system. (Zibakalam, 2020)

Zibakalam offers a sound critique of Golpayegani’s rhetoric, which relies heavily on revolutionary clichés devoid of a nuanced understanding of their consequences for the university system in Iran. These criticisms are echoed throughout the author’s essays on the Islamization of humanities, gender segregation in universities, and the dismissal of professors which are compiled in this book.

Purging Committees at Universities

One common flaw in Zibakalam’s critiques is his oversight of the diverse political affiliations among the academic community he champions. He overlooks the predominantly leftist and secular faculty who comprised the majority of the academic body at the time of the revolution and were subsequently labeled by various accusations during the Cultural Revolution. These individuals endured immense pressure, facing not only academic bans but also imprisonment, torture, and even death. This stands in contrast to the narrative of the Cultural Revolution presented by many leftist political activists, who claim its sole purpose was to eliminate leftist forces from universities. (See the interview with Mehrak Kamali) The purging of academics at the University of Tehran in the immediate aftermath of the revolution is a telling example.[3]For a report on scale of purges at other universities see Houshmand, 1400/2021: 52-58 The university’s post-revolutionary Board of Trustees formed a “Purification Council” (Shora-i Tazkiyeh) and steadfastly maintained that “corrupt individuals and foreign agents within the university community should not merely be dismissed but also subjected to prosecution and harsh penalties.”

They regretted that they did not find yet the “list of Freemasons at the University of Tehran!” (Maleki, 1359/1980: 25-26). Despite opposition from certain officials, the council members swiftly began publicizing their achievements. They claimed to have “expelled approximately 500 SAVAK agents from the university’s hallowed ground and bastion of freedom, with divine assistance and the support of dedicated faculty.” Furthermore, they asserted having “severely curtailed the influence of corrupt individuals, loyalists of the deposed Shah, and agents of imperialism and Zionism within the university.” To their disappointment, they confessed to having failed to uncover the purported “list of Freemasons at the University of Tehran” (ibid: 25-26).

Nearly all accounts of Iran’s Cultural Revolution corroborate the fact that a wide range of individuals, including many falsely accused, were subjected to university purges.[4]Some of the odd examples of these dismissals were Manouchehr Mortazavi, a prominent scholar on Hafez at Tabriz University, Allam Ali Raadi Azarakhshi from the National University, and Nader Afshar … Continue reading Most politically active professors, as previously mentioned, were dismissed or disappeared.[5]See the interviews with leaders of Cultural Revolution in Lowh Monthly, 1998-1999. While Zibakalam was evidently not involved in these councils, he has expressed remorse for his initial support of the Cultural Revolution and detailed his subsequent attempts to disengage from the process once dismissals began (Zibakalam, 1999, “I officially and publicly ask for forgiveness”).[6]Zibakalam’s 1999 interview with Lowh Monthly has been republished in this book with minor changes. His later publications, including open support letters for the professors purged from university in the 1990s,[7]The letters were addressed to the president Hashemi Rafsanjani (January 1993), Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (October 1994), and Hojatolislam Qaemmaqami (February 1995), the representative of the … Continue reading further solidify his opposition to such practices. (Zibakalam, 2020).

Rejecting the Cultural Revolution in Favor of Positivism

Zibakalam evolved from an active participant in the Cultural Revolution into one of its most vocal opponents. By his own admission, initial enthusiasm for the project gradually waned as doubts about its core principles grew. University and Revolution is a collection of essays penned following his intellectual break from the Cultural Revolution, aiming to articulate his critical stance on the project and emphasize its detrimental effects and consequences. This break is so profound that he publicly declares on multiple occasions that “every cell in my body is liberal.” Zibakalam departed Iran in 1984 to pursue his Ph.D. at the University of Bradford, England, and do his research on the Islamic Revolution. This decision, endorsed by the Cultural Revolution Council and backed by its leader, Abdolkarim Soroush, marks a pivotal moment in his disassociation with the basic ideas of the Cultural Revolution which he was troubled with its consequences in purging the professors. In this period, he began to question the pervasive narrative of colonialism and imperialism as the root cause of Iran’s underdevelopment, assigning significant blame to the Tudeh Party for propagating this ideology since the 1940s. (Zibakalam, 2020: “Why Iranian universities do not conduct much research?”). He argues that Cultural Revolution was a continuation of the U.S embassy takeover by pro-Imam Khomeini students on November 4, 1979, and both events relied on an anti-Western approach, assuming that “the dominance of tyranny, the dominance of the West, and the dominance of Freemasons over the university” prevented the establishment of Islamic sciences in Iran. (Zibakalam, 2020: “I officially and publicly ask for forgiveness”) Zibakalam extends his critique beyond colonialism and imperialism to challenge prevailing anti-Orientalist discourses. He broadly categorizes figures like Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Jalal Al-Ahmad, Ali Shariati, and Abdolhadi Hairi, oversimplifying their complex arguments against Orientalism. He reduces these critiques to a singular claim: “Westerners aimed to erase our history and culture through Orientalism, supplanting it with Western values.” Then easily dismisses them as “delusional” and ideas rooted in “conspiracy theories.” (Zibakalam, 2020: “Why Iranian universities do not conduct much research?”)

Zibakalam’s accessible writing and speaking style have contributed to his recognition as a public intellectual. Yet, this simplicity occasionally reveals a tendency towards oversimplification of complex issues, potentially undermining the subtlety of his arguments.  He outlines his transformative journey as a lesson learned about the necessity of distinguishing between the “functional aspects” of science, which are vulnerable to misuse for colonial or exploitative ends, and the pursuit of knowledge for “increasing understanding and awareness.” He ultimately defines science based on the latter aspect, the inherent drive to understand more.

In 1984, at the Bradford library, he realized he had previously held a “limited and narrow-minded view” of science. He writes, “I failed to comprehend how knowledge about whether Shah Ismail Safavi wrote more poetry in Turkish or Persian, or the meaning of his poetic metaphors five hundred years ago, could be practically applied to colonialism or imperialism.” He writes, “This type of research,” which he frequently encountered at the Bradford library, “is equally scientific, informative, and enlightening as exploring the Earth’s origin, deciphering the universe’s creation through physics, or determining the nature of light. All these inquiries constitute science, driven by humanity’s quest to expand its comprehension of the natural world and itself.” (ibid)  Such simplistic, positivist claims appear increasingly untenable given the transformations in philosophy, history, and sociology of science, which have elucidated the significant roles of power and politics in scientific inquiry. Zibakalam’s assessment of Iran’s universities, science, and humanities is rooted in this idealized view of science.

If, as Zibakalam contends, science is merely humanity’s pursuit of understanding itself and the natural world, then the very notion of scientific boundaries becomes untenable. This foundational assumption underpins his critique of the Western/Islamic science dichotomy and his challenge to the notion of Islamic humanities.

Employing his signature rhetorical style, Zibakalam poses a provocative question: “Can we, alongside or in opposition to Western humanities, cultivate distinct humanities such as Eastern, Islamic, Iranian, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Orthodox, Jewish, capitalist, or communist humanities?” (Zibakalam, 2020: “Islamic humanities, Western humanities, and dependency”). His response is an unequivocal no. Building upon his earlier intellectual transformation, he asserts that:

There is nothing more unscientific and foolish than this [sort of categorization of science]. Mechanical engineering is universally applicable, and the same principle holds true for social sciences. The notion that China’s communist system necessitates a distinct sociology or that Iran’s Islamic ideology requires a unique sociological approach… is fundamentally flawed. Those who have such claims do not understand what sociology is. (Zibakalam, 2020: “I officially and publicly ask for forgiveness.”)

While this review will not delve into critiquing proponents of Islamic science, it will assess the validity of Zibakalam’s critical framework, as this framework is essential to the overall effectiveness of his critique. He contends that the concept of Islamic humanities is both unattainable and undesirable. He argues that such a field has yielded no tangible results since its inception several decades ago during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, he posits that the pursuit of Islamic humanities is undesirable because it undermines the religion’s foundational certainties and the authority of divine revelation:

Many proponents of Islamic political science and sociology may inadvertently undermine the foundational certainty of Islamic teachings by juxtaposing divine law and prophetic guidance with the inherently uncertain domains of human inquiry. While the humanities and sciences thrive on doubt, skepticism, and empirical investigation, the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad are predicated on divine revelation.” (Zibakalam, 2020, “The Cultural Revolution practically achieved nothing”). 

In critiquing the 1979 Cultural Revolution, Zibakalam adheres to a purist conception of science, also the prevalence of the government’s “political considerations” in addressing “the activities of leftist student groups in universities and the troubles they caused across the country.” 

He notes that the activities of these groups, especially those operating beyond university campuses, within ethnic minority communities, and in industrial settings, presented formidable challenges for the government. He identifies two contrasting perspectives among officials in addressing the university problem. While individuals such as then-President Banisadr perceived these activities as a threat to national security, figures within the Revolutionary Council, including Bazargan and Beheshti, held a different view. They considered the prevailing open atmosphere as an inevitable source of tension and advocated for avoiding extensive confrontation with students. (ibid)          

It is safe to verify the accuracy of this categorization by checking the primary sources such as Revolutionary Council minutes. Back to Zibakalam’s perspective on the Cultural Revolution, he highlights the goal of enhancing universities’ research capacities to align with post-revolutionary Iran’s needs, rather than the political purges. He argues that this goal was also pursued in the Construction Jihad, of which he claims to have been a founding member. (ibid)

The evidence suggests that Zibakalam and many others were not firmly committed to a specific stance on the Cultural Revolution then. He was involved in various activities, simultaneously defending the localization of knowledge and academia through speeches to student groups of Islamic associations. He emphasized that different regions have different needs and should be reflected in academic fields such as business management.

Zibakalam like many other young Islamic scholars at the time held ambivalent views on the Cultural Revolution. Simultaneously engaged in various activities, he would advocate for the contextualization of knowledge and academic activities in his lectures for students’ Islamic association: “there is a business management which responds to our specific needs, while a place like Washington needs a business management that fits its needs.” He would recommend treat heterodox academics with tolerance while writing and lecturing in support of the students’ embassy takeover, which served the Cultural Revolution as he notes later.  Zibakalam later characterized both incidents as mistakes and expressed regret for his involvement in them. While his concurrent efforts to remind the history is valuable, his retrospective accounts should not overshadow the complex interplay of forces and their roles during that era. 

Ideology/Anti-Ideology

Zibakalam has a tendency to attribute any disliked norms or incidents to Marxist influence. He argues that the notion of distinct Islamic, Western, and Communist humanities is initially inspired by Marxist view and their assertion that universities relied on the West and a corrupt capitalist system during the Shah’s regime. They proposed that the university curriculum should be popular, revolutionary, and indigenous. This lays the ground for these categorical distinctions.   He consistently equates the anti-Western stances of Islamic, secular left, and Tudeh Party, neglecting to differentiate between the diverse anti-Western and Westoxication perspectives within these groups. (Zibakalam, 1998: 121-124.) Zibakalam presents a monolithic view of the “left” as he does with Orientalism, Islam, and Marxism, often reducing it to a Stalinist orthodoxy aligned with the Tudeh Party of Iran. This oversimplification obscures the diversity and complexity of the left movement.[8]Many scholars, from different angles of thought, have criticized him on this subject. Bashiriyeh (Zibakalam, 2016: 369) and Shapur Ravasani (Zibakalam, 2014: 403) are examples that have been added to … Continue reading Zibakalam’s rhetorical style may inadvertently lead to ideological interpretations serving homogenous portrayal of ‘the others.’ This is particularly evident in his critique of the Cultural Revolution, where he simultaneously condemns the “ideologization of science” while also identifying “anti-Westernism” as a disastrous consequence of the Cultural Revolution (Zibakalam, 2020: “What is history”). 

Cultivating the State or Cooking for the Masses?

As previously noted, Zibakalam often seeks to redefine Iran by the standards he attached to the West while consistently targets a governmental audience in all his efforts, whether analyzing the Cultural Revolution or critiquing the state of humanities and universities. It seems that he is still writing open letters to officials—similar to those included in the book—hoping they might be read. Even when addressing young students considering humanities, Zibakalam’s focus often shifts from their concerns to a critique of the backwardness of humanities in Iran. Rather than engaging directly with students, his discourse frequently targets those shaping the humanities agenda. (Zibakalam, 2020: “The state of humanities in Iran”)

As a public intellectual, Zibakalam demonstrates a keen interest in cultivating the state. While a detailed analysis of his pedagogical approach is beyond the scope of this discussion, his Western-oriented perspective is readily apparent. Regardless of his approach, a fundamental question persists: is the Iranian state, in its current form, receptive to reform? From its inception, this government grappled with the question “What shall we do with the universities?” This culminated in the Cultural Revolution, a top-down decision, made behind closed doors without input from academia, that periodically destabilized the university system for over four decades. Those who drove universities to their current crisis disregard the sacrifices of countless individuals who built and developed these institutions. A rigorous examination of state policies might compel us to rethink about the idea of state-reforming and explore alternatives beyond its confines.

References

Ayandegan Newspaper. 1979. April 5, p. 11.
Houshmand, Ehsan. 2021. “Examination of the Process and Nature of the Cultural Revolution.” Iranian Perspectives (Chesmandazeh Iran), Special Issue on the Background of the Cultural Revolution: University in Suspension, December 2021.
Maleki, Mohammad. 1980. Tehran University and the Footprint of American Imperialism. Place of publication: Publisher.
Matin‐Asgari, Afshin. 1998. “The Causes of Iran’s Backwardness.” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 7 (13): 103–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/10669929808720134
Nabavi, Seyyed Abdolamir. 2021. “The Revolutionary Council and the University Issue: A Reexamination of the Revolutionary Council’s Negotiations from 1978 to 1980.” *Quarterly Journal of University Studies*, 1(2): 109-134.
Saif, Ahmad. 1998. “Root Cause Analysis or Root Digging.” Contemporary History of Iran (tyrikhi Moaseri Iran), 5: 237-255.
Zibakalam, Sadegh. 1979. “Counter-Revolution Continues to Target Universities.” Ettelaat Newspaper, December 29, p. 5.
Zibakalam, Sadegh. [1995] 1996. How We Became What We Are: An Analysis of the Causes of Backwardness in Iran. Tehran: Rozaneh. Second edition.
Zibakalam, Sadegh. 1998a. Tradition and Modernism. Tehran: Rozaneh.
Zibakalam, Sadegh. 1998b. “A Response to a Critique.” Contemporary History of Iran, 6: 293-302.
Zibakalam, Sadegh. [2001] 2019. University and Revolution. Tehran: Rozaneh.

Endnotes

Endnotes
1The book publisher claims that the Guardian newspaper praised University and Revolution as “the most significant work in the field of Iranian sociology following the Islamic Revolution.”
2For some examples of these critics, see the critical notes authored by Saeed Zibakalam and others published as appendixes of the book. Also see Ahmad Seif (1998/1377) and Afshin Matin-Asgari (1998).
3For a report on scale of purges at other universities see Houshmand, 1400/2021: 52-58
4Some of the odd examples of these dismissals were Manouchehr Mortazavi, a prominent scholar on Hafez at Tabriz University, Allam Ali Raadi Azarakhshi from the National University, and Nader Afshar Naderi from the University of Tehran. Also see the letter of Qahreman Shams, a member of the scientific board of University of Tehran to Prime Minister Bazargan requesting to stop this process. (Ayandagan, April 6, 1979, p. 11)
5See the interviews with leaders of Cultural Revolution in Lowh Monthly, 1998-1999.
6Zibakalam’s 1999 interview with Lowh Monthly has been republished in this book with minor changes.
7The letters were addressed to the president Hashemi Rafsanjani (January 1993), Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (October 1994), and Hojatolislam Qaemmaqami (February 1995), the representative of the Supreme Leader at University of Tehran.
8Many scholars, from different angles of thought, have criticized him on this subject. Bashiriyeh (Zibakalam, 2016: 369) and Shapur Ravasani (Zibakalam, 2014: 403) are examples that have been added to the book as appendix. Others include Saif (1998), Seyed Alireza Beheshti (Zibakalam, 1998a: 44) and Afshan Matin Asgari. The later scholar argues he is ideological and idealistic in his formulation of Iran underdevelopment: “He sees the left as a single entity and equals Marxism to Stalinism as the Iranian left is reduced to the Tudeh Party. It is weird that he does not notice his argument against the existence of feudalism in Iran and theories of absolutism in the East and the Asian mode of production are theories formulated by the left figures outside the party Tudeh during the 1960s-70s. (Matin-Asgari, 1998: 104)
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